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Abstract 
This paper studies how future tense marking affects the terms of bank loans. We predict 
that languages that grammatically mark the future affect speakers’ intertemporal 
preferences and thereby reduce the perception of the risks associated with loan issuance. 
We test this hypothesis on a sample of 977 bank loans from 17 European countries. We 
observe that the use of a language with future tense marking is associated with lower loan 
spreads and lower collateral use in loan contracts. The results corroborate Chen 
(American Economic Review, 2013)’s hypothesis that future tense marking makes the 
future more distant than the present. They suggest that linguistic structure affects terms of 
loan contracts. 
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1. Introduction 
Language structure has been shown to influence economic outcomes by shaping 
decision-making. The key underlying idea is that language has an effect on cognition and 
behavior, and through that channel it affects the economic behavior of agents.1 A 
linguistic feature that has received considerable attention in economics is future tense, 
following the seminal paper from Chen (2013). This paper explains how the future tense 
marking in language can shape the behavior of individuals. Languages differ in how they 
encode references to future events. On the one hand, languages like German use the 
present tense to talk about the future. As a consequence, these languages have no clear 
separation of the present and the future, and this is referred to as a weak future time 
reference (FTR). On the other hand, languages like English and French require future 
tense marking. English and French use different grammatical forms to talk about the 
future, that is, either auxiliary verbs (e.g., English) or a dedicated future tense form (e.g., 
French). Consequently these languages have a distinctive separation of the present and 
the future, and this is referred to as a strong FTR.  
Chen (2013) tests the hypothesis that languages that grammatically separate the 
present and the future make speakers dissociate the future from the present. As a 
consequence, the language would exert an influence on the intertemporal preferences. 
Speakers with a strong FTR would have a less future-oriented behavior than speakers 
with a weak FTR. He finds evidence in favor of this hypothesis by showing that speakers 
of strong FTR save less but also invest less in their health than speakers of weak FTR. 
Recent works have provided support for the influence of the future tense on economic 
behavior. Mavisakalyan, Tarverdi, and Weber (2018) show that speakers of weak-FTR 
languages are more willing to address environmental problems than speakers of strong-
FTR languages. Chen et al. (2017) observe that weak-FTR language firms have higher 
precautionary cash holdings. These findings support the hypothesis that the dissociation 
between the present and the future contributes to reducing how much economic agents 
care about the future. 
 
1 See Mavisakalyan and Weber (2018) for a survey of the literature. 
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The influence of future tense on the individual savings behavior was shown by 
Chen (2013) and on corporate financial decision-making by Chen et al. (2017), who also 
raise questions regarding how future tense can shape private debt contracts such as bank 
loans. Namely, a strong-FTR language contributes to making the future feel more distant 
and thus tends to alter the perception of risks associated with bank loan issuance. Indeed, 
linguistic perception of the future may affect the design of the credit contract and thus 
key loan characteristics. The latter transpose contractually a myriad of banking risks such 
as credit risk, renegotiation risk, collateral risk… Ultimately, future tense may lead 
contracting parties to misperceive the importance of default risk (loan losses for the 
lender, bankruptcy costs and/or loss of reputation for the borrowing firm).  
The objective of this paper is to investigate whether this prediction can be 
confirmed. To this end, we perform a cross-country investigation on a large dataset of 
loans from European countries. We test whether the future tense form influences the loan 
characteristics. In line with the literature on loan characteristics (e.g., Qian and Strahan, 
2007), we consider three key loan variables: the interest rate, the maturity, and that the 
loan is secured with collateral. Our hypothesis predicts that bank loan contracts have 
lower loan spreads, are less often secured, have longer maturity to borrowers in countries 
with strong FTR. 
European countries provide an excellent opportunity to study the effects of the 
future tense on the loan feature contracts for two reasons. First, the design of credit 
contracts is very important in Europe because the European financial system is bank 
based (de Haan et al., 2012; Gomes and Phillips, 2012) and European companies are 
much more dependent on private credit for external financing than U.S. companies. 
Second, strong-FTR and weak-FTR languages coexist in Europe. Strong-FTR languages 
include all Romance languages (e.g., French, Italian), Slavic languages (e.g., Czech, 
Polish), English, and Hungarian, and weak-FTR languages are all Germanic languages 
other than English (e.g., German, Swedish), Estonian, and Finnish. 
Our paper contributes to two debates in the literature. First, we augment the 
literature on the impact of linguistic structure on economic outcomes by investigating the 
influence of future tense on loan contract terms. We complement Chen (2013)’s work on 
individual saving behavior by investigating corporate lending behavior. Second, we 
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improve our understanding of the determinants of loan characteristics. This vast literature 
has shown the influence of legal (Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009; 
Waisman, 2013; Hasan et al., 2014) and economic determinants, for example, monetary 
policy (Delis, Hasan and Mylonidis, 2017) and economic policy uncertainty (Ashraf and 
Shen, 2019). We extend this literature in the direction of culture and, more precisely, of 
language. Former works have already provided evidence on cultural differences 
(Giannetti and Yafeh, 2012) and on social capital (Hasan et al., 2017) but never on 
language. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
background of the research question. Section 3 describes the data and the methodology. 
Section 4 reports the results, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background 
 
2.1 Language and behavior 
The claim of an influence of language on cognition and behavior is at the heart of 
the linguistic relativity hypothesis (LRH), also known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. The 
strong version of the hypothesis considers that language determines the range of 
cognitive processes; therefore, a linguistic determinism would exist. The weak version of 
the hypothesis says that language exerts some constraints in some areas of cognition; 
thus, it is associated with the existence of a linguistic influence. 
Both versions of the hypothesis had been ignored until the early 1990s for several 
reasons. First, some linguists such as Noam Chomsky consider that the principles 
underlying the linguistic structure are biologically determined in the human brain and, 
consequently, hereditary (Chomsky, 1957). Therefore, because linguistic structure is 
innate and shared by all individuals, it would not influence cognition. Second, the strong 
version of the hypothesis generates negative reactions because of its implication 
consigning individuals from different languages to different inner lives. The underlying 
idea is that individuals speaking some languages are not able to have certain thoughts, 
which has unpopular implications. Third, the hypothesis did not obtain empirical support. 
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As stressed by Mavisakalyan and Weber (2018), early empirical works suffered from 
weak empirical design and from several methodological problems. 
The LRH has, however, experienced a new interest since the 1990s. This change 
has been motivated by new empirical works supporting the weak version of the LRH 
(Levinson, 1996; Boroditsky, Schmidt and Phillips, 2003), and the strong version of the 
LRH being rejected in the literature. Thus, the language would shape behavior without 
controlling cognitive process. To illustrate that sentence, we consider how Russian and 
English define colors. Although English has a generic word for blue, Russian does not; 
Russian has one word for light blue (“goluboy”) and another one word for dark blue 
(“siniy”). The consequence of this linguistic difference is that Russian speakers must 
distinguish light blue from dark blue when they talk about colors. Winaver et al. (2007) 
then show that Russian speakers are faster than English speakers to discriminate different 
shades of blue. 
The literature on the relationship between linguistic structures and behavior then 
investigated several linguistic features including gender (Mavisakalyan, 2015), pronoun 
use (Davis and Abdurazokzoda, 2016), foreign language (Costa, Vives and Corey, 2017), 
and future tense. We elaborate on the latter in the next section. 
 
2.2 Future tense 
Languages differ in how they encode references to future events. Languages such 
as German use the present tense to talk about the future, and languages such as English 
and French require future tense marking. English and French can use different 
grammatical forms to talk about the future, either with an auxiliary verb (e.g., English), or 
with a dedicated future tense form (e.g., French). We, respectively, call these languages 
weak-FTR and strong-FTR languages. 
A concrete example can be used to explain these differences: 
German: Morgen präsentiere ich dieses Paper  
English: I will present this paper tomorrow 
French : Je présenterai ce papier demain 
The influence of the future tense on the economic behavior has been investigated 
following the seminal paper of Chen (2013). This work explains how the future tense 
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marking can affect the behavior of individuals. The idea is that both categories of 
languages differ in the separation between the present and the future. Strong-FTR 
languages have a distinctive separation for the present and the future, and weak-FTR 
languages do not.  
In a cross-country analysis with data on individuals, Chen (2013) tests the 
hypothesis that languages that grammatically separate the present and the future make 
speakers dissociate the future from the present in their decisions. The future tense 
marking would then affect the intertemporal preferences. Speakers with a strong-FTR 
time would have a less future-oriented behavior than speakers with a weak FTR. He finds 
evidence in favor of this hypothesis by showing that speakers of strong-FTR languages 
save less but also invest less in their health than speakers of weak FTR. 
The conclusion of Chen (2013) that future tense marking influences economic 
behavior has been confirmed in other works extending this seminal paper in different 
directions. Chen et al. (2017) extend Chen (2013)’s analysis to incorporate decisions by 
investigating whether weak-FTR language firms have higher precautionary cash 
holdings. The argumentation is similar because cash policy at the corporate level has a lot 
in common with savings behavior at the individual level. Both behaviors are motivated 
by a precautionary motive. They test this hypothesis on a large cross-country sample of 
listed firms from 44 countries. They show that cash holdings are higher for weak-FTR 
language firms. This finding then supports the hypothesis that the dissociation between 
the present and the future contributes to reducing how much economic agents care about 
the future. In another cross-country analysis with data on individuals, Mavisakalyan, 
Tarverdi, and Weber (2018) question whether speakers of strong-FTR languages would 
be more reluctant to address environmental problems. This assumption is again in 
accordance with the perspective that the language affects intertemporal preferences. This 
assumption is based on the argument that individuals forced to cleave the future from the 
present would care less about future detrimental events and more about immediate costs. 
They observe evidence that the presence of future tense marking diminishes 
environmentally responsible behavior, and this result is in line with Chen’s prediction. 
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2.3 Hypothesis 
By following the linguistic-savings hypothesis from Chen (2013), we develop a 
linguistic hypothesis for loans. A strong-FTR language makes the future feel more distant 
from the present and, as a consequence, alters the importance of the risks associated with 
the loan contract, such as credit risk, renegotiation risk, or collateral risk. Ultimately, a 
strong FTR language affects the perception of loan default risk. These banking risks 
occur in the future, and loan contracts are negotiated in the present. Potential losses for 
the lender and potential costs for the borrower (bankruptcy costs, loss of reputation) 
associated with the loan default are less important in the mind of both contracting parties 
when the future is more distant. We therefore test the hypothesis that a strong-FTR 
language leads to more favorable terms in loan contracts. This hypothesis must be 
detailed to be a testable prediction. 
We must specify which loan contract terms are considered in the analysis. We 
consider three loan contract terms in our analysis in line with the literature on loan 
characteristics (Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009; Giannetti and Yafeh, 
2012).2 We focus on the loan spread because it considers the assessment of the credit risk 
associated with the loan. We also consider two nonprice terms: presence of collateral and 
loan maturity. We consider the presence of collateral in the loan contract because of its 
key role to diminish credit risk. In addition to mitigating problems resulting from 
information asymmetries, collateral is widely used by banks to reduce the risk of loan 
loss in the event of default. Empirical evidence has shown that banks require more 
collateral from riskier borrowers (Berger and Udell, 1990; Jimenez and Saurina, 2004). 
Loan maturity is also considered because of its direct association with the perception of 
the future, and a longer loan means more distant repayments and thus more risks (Berger 
et al., 2005). 
We must also choose whose language must be considered in the work. Namely, a 
lending relationship combines by definition a borrower and at least one lender, and both 
contracting parties can be from different countries. Therefore, we must decide whether 
 
2 We do not consider loan covenants as this contractual feature mitigates moral hazard problems and is 
difficult to relate to the link between FTR language and perception of banking risks. 
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we test the influence of the language of the borrower or of the lender. We adopt the 
language of the borrower for three reasons. 
First, cross-country works in the literature on the determinants of loan 
characteristics have considered the determinants in the country of the borrower. Qian and 
Strahan (2007) examine how laws and institutions shape the terms of loans and consider 
to this end the legal and institutional framework in the country of the borrower. Similarly, 
Bae, and Goyal (2009) perform an analysis of the impact of the enforceability of 
contracts on loan contract terms and focus on the country of the borrower. 
Second, our sample consists of large loans in which borrowers, that is, large 
companies, have a bargaining power because they are not uniquely funded by bank loans. 
The situation is therefore totally different from small companies that could be constrained 
to accept loan terms chosen by the lender. We do not argue that all loan contract terms 
are decided by the borrower but it is the borrower who usually initiates the negotiation to 
obtain a bank loan and ultimately agrees to the final credit contract.  
Third, the vast majority of loans in our sample are syndicated loans, that is, loans 
for which at least two banks jointly grant funds to a company. The specific nature of 
these loans is not at all a topic for our research question, because we are concerned about 
the impact of the language on the loan contract terms, and syndicated loans are standard 
loan contracts. However, it practically means that loans generally combine several 
lenders, which makes identifying the language of the lender difficult in loan contracts 
with syndicates combining different nationalities of banks. By focusing on the nationality 
of the borrower, we avoid this identification concern. 
For all these reasons, we focus on the language of the borrower rather than the 
language of the lender. Notably, this question only has importance for the cross-country 
loan contracts in our sample, which represents 43% of the observations. All other cases 
are domestic loans, for which by definition the languages of the borrower and the lender 
are the same. 3 Nevertheless, we perform a robustness check to test the alternative choice 
of the language of the lender in the estimations. 
 
3 We perform robustness checks on a sub-sample with domestic loans only. 
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Thus, our hypothesis leads to the following testable prediction: A strong-FTR 
language for the borrower is associated with lower loan spreads, lower presence of 
collateral, and longer maturity in the loan contract. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1 Measurement of future tense 
We use the classification of languages based on the data from Chen (2013). We 
consider two types of languages based on the FTR. The first category of languages is the 
strong-FTR languages that require the use of a dedicated marking of the future. The 
second category of languages contains the weak-FTR languages in which speakers can 
talk about the future with the present tense. The key independent variable is Strong FTR, 
which is a dummy variable equal to one if the language of the borrower is a strong-FTR 
language and zero otherwise. 
We consider only European countries with a dominant language to ensure proper 
identification of the borrower language.4 We therefore exclude three European 
multilingual countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland) from the analysis. For such 
countries, the identification can be erroneous even if we consider the dominant language 
of the city of origin of the borrower. For instance, many Belgian companies have their 
headquarters in Brussels, a majority–French-speaking city, and can have Flemish-
speaking top management because Brussels is the economic capital of the country located 
inside the Flemish-speaking region and the seat of the Flemish Region (it is not the seat 
of the French-speaking Walloon Region). The same issues occur in Luxembourg because 
the country is fully polyglot, with the vast majority of inhabitants speaking the strong-
FTR French and the weak-FTR German and Luxembourgish.5 
To test the sensitivity of our results, we also consider an alternative coding for the 
languages. As explained by Chen (2013), strong-FTR languages include inflectional 
markers such as the future-indicating suffixes in French and periphrastic markers such as 
 
4 All countries in our sample have one official language or have one language as the native language of the 
large majority of the population (e.g., Finnish in Finland).  
5 A 2018 survey shows that French is spoken by 98% of the Luxembourg population, and German and 
Luxembourgish are, respectively, spoken by 78% and 77% (TNS Ilres survey for the Ministry of National 
Education, Childhood and Youth in Luxembourg). 
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the English auxiliary “will.” Therefore, a stronger criterion for the FTR is the presence of 
an inflectional future tense, and we also create the dummy variable Very Strong FTR, 
which is a dummy variable equal to one if the language of the borrower has inflectional 
markers for the future time. Given that Very Strong FTR is more restrictive than Strong 
FTR, the finding of an influence of the language with the first variable in addition to this 
finding with the second variable would strengthen the relevance of our conclusions. 
 
3.2 Data and variables 
We obtain a sample of bank loans from the Bloomberg database that provides 
detailed information on loans to large companies. We use loan data for the period of 
January 1999 to December 2017. In line with the literature on loans (e.g., Qian and 
Strahan, 2007), we exclude loans to firms from the financial industry (SIC 6) and from 
the public sector (SIC 9). Public ownership or a monopoly situation are likely to 
influence the risk of loans granted to these firms, and interbank loans have specific 
features. We only include observations for which information is available for the main 
loan characteristics: loan spread, loan maturity, and loan amount. At this stage, the 
sample contains 2,601 loans. Next, we also include information to control for borrower 
characteristics. Due to data availability, this last filter significantly reduces the sample 
size. The final sample comprises 977 loans from 17 European countries.  
The focus of our research is the relation between the FTR and the loan 
characteristics. In line with literature on loans, we focus on three loan characteristics. The 
first one is the loan spread measured by the basis points spread over LIBOR inclusive of 
all fees (Spread). The second characteristic is the loan maturity measured in years 
(Maturity). The third one is the presence of collateral measured by a dummy variable 
(Secured) equal to one if the loan is secured and to zero otherwise. We use the log of 
Spread and the log of Maturity in the estimations, to follow Qian and Strahan (2007), 
among others. This specification is also motivated by the large dispersion of these 
variables in the sample. 
 We consider a set of loan-level control variables to consider the features of the 
loan: the amount of the loan, the presence of covenants, the number of lenders involved 
in the loan, the presence of lenders belonging to league tables, and the existence of 
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borrower-lender relationship. We also include four variables at the firm level which can 
influence loan characteristics: size, indebtedness, profitability, and current ratio. All 
variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Our analysis of the link between the FTR and loan characteristics controls for a 
range of observable features of countries that have been accounted for in the literature on 
the determinants of loan characteristics. 
GDP per capita controls for economic development and is expressed in current 
US$. GDP per capita is from the World Bank World Development Indicators. Sovereign 
rating controls for the sovereign default risk of the country which can influence loan 
characteristics of the companies. It is measured with the Standard and Poor’s LT Issuer 
rating extracted from Thomson Reuters. The ratings are coded in eight categories that are 
present in the sample, such that AAA is 1 and C is 8. Financial development is measured 
with the ratio of financial resources provided to the private sector by financial institutions 
divided by GDP (Private credit) and the total value of all listed shares in a stock market 
as a percentage of GDP (Stock market capitalization). Both latter variables are extracted 
from the Global Financial Development Database from the World Bank.  
Table 1 displays the composition of the sample per year and per country. Table 2 
reports the descriptive statistics for all variables used in the estimations6. Notably, 70% of 
loans in the sample are from countries with a strong-FTR language. When considering 
very strong-FTR language, the sample is almost split into two equal populations because 
50% of loans are from countries with a very strong-FTR language. Notably, the figures 
are very similar when considering the language of the lender rather than the language of 
the borrower: the figures are then, respectively, 69% and 52% for strong-FTR language 
and very strong-FTR language. 
Additionally, the mean loan spread is 207.13 basis points; the average loan maturity 
is close to 6 years; 36% of loans are secured and 15% have covenants attached; the 
average amount is above USD 2 billion and confirms that the sample includes large 
loans; and the average number of lenders is 14 and in line with the view that the vast 
majority of loans are syndicated loans. 15% of lead lenders belong to the European 
league table and 14% of the borrowers have a relationship with their lenders. 
 
6 Firm level variables are symmetrically winsorized at 5%. 
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3.3 Econometric specification 
To analyze the relationship between language FTR and loan characteristics, we run 
regressions of loan features on the language FTR and a set of control variables: 
Loan characteristicijk =  +  Strong FTRijk +  Xi + Yk +  Zj + ijk   
 (1) 
where Loan characteristic is alternatively Spread, Secured, or Maturity; Strong 
FTR is the dummy variable for the strong future tense reference; X is the set of loan-
specific control variables; Y is the set of firm-specific control variables; Z is the set of 
country-level control variables; i is for the loan, k is for the firm, and j is for the country. 
The equation is estimated with OLS for Spread and Maturity, and with a probit model for 
Secured because this variable is a dummy variable. We include year fixed effects in the 
estimations to control for the influence of the business cycle. Standard deviations are 
clustered by borrower in all estimations. 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Main estimations 
We investigate whether future tense marking influences loan characteristics. We 
perform regressions explaining loan spread, loan maturity, and presence of collateral. The 
estimations are reported in Tables 3 to 5. In each table, we test four specifications. In the 
first two columns, we use the variable Strong FTR. In the last two columns, we use the 
variable Very Strong FTR. In each case, we consider only a set of loan-specific control 
variables in the first column and the full set of loan-specific and country-level control 
variables in the second column. 
First, we analyze how future tense marking affects spread. We observe that the 
coefficient of the language variable is negative in all estimations and significant in three 
of the four specifications. We observe no significant coefficient only in the second 
specification using Strong FTR and the full set of control variables. This result is more 
observed with the more restrictive variable Very Strong FTR and strengthens its 
relevance. Therefore, we observe that a strong FTR is associated with lower spread. This 
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lower spread consequently accords with the view that a strong-FTR language contributes 
to making the future feel more distant and, as such, reduces the perception of risks 
involved in the loan contracts. 
Second, we consider the relation between future tense marking and the presence of 
collateral. We observe that the coefficient of the language variable is negative and 
significant in all estimations. Therefore, we obtain evidence that a strong future reference 
contributes to reducing the presence of collateral in the loan contracts. As such, this result 
corroborates the hypothesis that a strong-FTR language reduces the importance of risks in 
the long-run. The absence of collateral in a loan contract enhances the potential losses for 
the bank.  
Third, we investigate how future tense marking affects the loan maturity. We 
observe no significant coefficient in all estimations. In other words, a strong FTR exerts 
no influence on the loan maturity. This finding is at odds with our hypothesis that the 
language would affect loan maturity. 
In summary, our results provide support for the influence of future tense marking 
on loan characteristics. The use of a strong-FTR language is significantly associated with 
lower loan spread and lower collateral, but does not influence loan maturity. These results 
support the idea that future tense marking affects the economic behavior of agents 
involved in the contracting of loans. These results corroborate the conclusion of Chen 
(2013) regarding individual savings behavior: a strong-FTR language contributes to 
making the future feel more distant than the present. 
 
4.2 Robustness checks 
Our main estimations already include several tests to control for the sensitivity of 
our results. We use two alternative specifications for the language variable and two 
different sets of control variables. We provide additional procedures to check the 
robustness of our findings. 
First, we focus on the language of the lender in the estimations. We have, until 
now, focused our analysis on the language of the borrower in line with the view that the 
borrower characteristics should be the characteristics influencing the most loan features. 
We have motivated this choice. We can, however, question if our findings would stand if 
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we instead consider the language of the lender. Because most loans in our sample are 
syndicated loans, we consider the language of the lead bank in the syndicate. Namely, a 
syndicated loan combines the funds of several banks to provide the transaction to a 
company. In that process, a lead bank establishes the relationship with the company and 
negotiates the terms of the loan contract. This bank then searches for participant banks 
willing to grant a share of the loan. The language of the lender can therefore be defined as 
the language of the lead bank, because of its key role in the negotiation of the loan 
contract terms with the borrower. 
Thus, we redo our estimations by now using the language of the lender. We use 
dummy variables Strong-FTR Lender and Very Strong-FTR Lender, which are equal to 
one if the language of the lender is, respectively, a strong-FTR language or has 
inflectional markers for the future time. We report the results in Table 6. 
We first examine the influence of future tense marking on the loan spread. We 
observe strong evidence that a strong-FTR is associated with lower spread: the coefficient 
of the language variable is significantly negative in all estimations. We consider it 
notable to show that this finding corroborates what has been observed when considering 
the language of the borrower, for which the results were similar, except for being only 
significant in three of the four estimations. 
Next, we investigate the relation between future tense and presence of collateral. 
Coefficients for the language variables are significant only in regressions without country 
level control variables. Given that the estimations with the language of the borrower 
show a significant and negative coefficient in all estimations, this result shows a slight 
difference between the language of the borrower and the language of the lender when not 
controlling for country variables. We further address the impact of FTR on the loan 
maturity. We again observe no significant impact.  
We thus observe the same findings when we use the language of the lender or the 
language of the borrower. We again observe that a strong future tense is associated with 
lower loan spread and lower use of collateral. 
Second, we use a subsample of domestic loans only which reduces the number of 
loans by half. The language, and thus the future tense marking, is now the same for the 
borrower and the (lead) lender. So the use of this subsample avoids any concern related to 
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the choice of the language of the borrower or of the lender. Table 7 provides the results. 
We observe strong support for the impact of the future tense marking on loan spread: the 
coefficient of the language variable is significantly negative in all four estimations. We 
do not find evidence on the influence of the future tense marking on collateral, while we 
still do not find support for the impact on maturity. 
Third, we include an indicator for economic policy uncertainty in the estimations 
since uncertainty in government policies exerts an influence on borrower average risk. In 
line with that, Ashraf and Shen (2019) have shown that greater economic policy 
uncertainty increases banks’ loan pricing. 
We therefore want to check if the inclusion of this variable to take into account 
these cross-country differences in economic policy uncertainty influences our results. 
To this end, we redo our estimations by adding the variable Economic Policy 
Uncertainty, which is the yearly average of economic policy uncertainty index provided 
by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016). 
We report the results in Table 8. We find again support for the impact of the 
future tense marking on loan spread, with a significantly negative coefficient of the 
language in both estimations, but no significant coefficient when explaining collateral 
and maturity. 
Fourth, we use alternative specifications, notably by including Spread (log), 
Secured and Maturity (log) as explanatory variables in the Secured and Maturity 
regressions. The results, available upon request, remain similar to those in tables 4 and 5. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine how future tense marking affects the terms of bank loans. 
We test the hypothesis that a strong-FTR language is associated with lower loan spreads, 
lower presence of collateral, and longer maturity in the loan contract. This hypothesis is 
motivated by the idea that a strong-FTR language makes the future feel more distant than 
the present. We provide evidence supporting this hypothesis. The use of a strong FTR 
language is significantly associated with lower loan spreads and lower collateral use in 
loan contracts, and weakly associated with shorter loan maturity. 
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Therefore, our findings support the conclusion from Chen (2013): future tense 
marking influences economic behavior. We assert that our work presents topics for 
further research on bank loans. Individual loan datasets in multilingual countries could be 
used to confirm the relevance of our findings. In addition, this study is novel in its work 
on the influence of linguistic structure on loan term contracts. Other linguistic features 
such as gender or personal pronouns can also affect the cognition of loan contracting 
parties and influence loan terms. 
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Appendix: Brief description of all variables and their sources 
 
Variable Description Source 
Language variables 
Strong FTR =1 if the language of the borrower has a strong 
future-time reference, =0 otherwise 
Chen (2013) 
Very Strong FTR =1 if the language of the borrower has 
inflectional markets for the future time, =0 
otherwise 
Chen (2013) 
Lender Strong FTR =1 if the language of the lender has a strong 
future-time reference, =O otherwise 
Chen (2013) 
Lender Very Strong 
FTR 
=1 if the language of the lender has inflectional 
markets for the future time, =0 otherwise 
Chen (2013) 
Loan contract variables 
Loan Spread  Loan spread in basis points Bloomberg 
Maturity Maturity of the loan in years Bloomberg 
Secured =1 if the loan is secured by collateral, =0 
otherwise 
Bloomberg 
Amount Size of the loan in thousands of dollars Bloomberg 
Covenants =1 if the loan includes financial covenants, =0 
otherwise 
Bloomberg 
Lenders Number of lenders Bloomberg 
League =1 if the lead lender is listed among the top 3 of 
the Bloomberg European league table 
Bloomberg 
Relationship =1 if the lead lender issued a loan for the same 
borrower during the last 3 years 
Bloomberg 
Borrower variables   
Total assets (log) Log of total assets in millions of dollars Bloomberg 
Debt / assets Total debt to total assets Bloomberg 
ROA Return on assets Bloomberg 
Current ratio Current assets to current liabilities Bloomberg 
Country variables  
GDP per capita GDP per capita in USD. World Bank 
Private Credit Private credit by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions to GDP 
Global Financial 
Development Database 
Sovereign rating Standard and Poor’s LT Issuer Rating (coded in 
eight categories from 1 for AAA to 8 for C) 
Thomson Reuters 
Stock market 
capitalization 
Total value of all listed shares in a stock market 
as a percentage of GDP 
Global Financial 
Development Database 
Economic Policy 
Uncertainty 
Yearly average of Economic Policy Uncertainty 
scaled by 100 
Baker, Bloom and Davis 
(2016) 
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Table 1. 
Composition of the sample 
 
This table shows the number of loans in the sample by year and country. 
 
Year Loans Country Loans 
1999 5 Austria 9 
2000 25 Czechia 6 
2001 32 Denmark 13 
2002 31 Finland 21 
2003 55 France 247 
2004 69 Germany 130 
2005 123 Greece 11 
2006 90 Hungary 11 
2007 120 Ireland 13 
2008 93 Italy 78 
2009 55 Netherlands 100 
2010 4 Poland 13 
2011 38 Portugal 6 
2012 40 Slovenia 3 
2013 92 Spain 169 
2014 65 Sweden 30 
2015 40 UK 117 
    
Total 977 Total 977 
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Table 2. 
Descriptive statistics 
This table indicates the mean values and standard deviations for the variables in the estimations. 
 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Median 
Strong FTR 0.70 0.46 1 
Very strong FTR 0.50 0.50 1 
Strong FTR Lender 0.69 0.46 1 
Very Strong FTR Lender 0.52 0.50 1 
Amount 2,069.05 9,156.25 600 
Spread 207.13 158.63 200 
Maturity 6.15 3.18 6 
Secured 0.36 0.48 0 
Covenants 0.15 0.36 0 
Lenders 14.01 12.82 10 
League 0.15 0.35 0 
Relationship 0.14 0.35 0 
Total assets (log) 8.24 1.94 8.16 
Debt / Assets 0.34 0.19 0.33 
ROA 0.03 0.06 0.03 
Current ratio 0.01 0.01 0.01 
GDP per capita 36,625.82 9,809.13 36,526.77 
Private credit 1.08 0.35 0.97 
Stock market cap. 0.76 0.31 0.76 
Sovereign rating 1.50 0.90 1 
Economic Policy 
Uncertainty 1.13 0.47 0.99 
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Table 3. 
Loan spread 
 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions examining the relation between the future tense reference 
and loan spread. The dependent variable is the log of Spread. Definitions of variables are provided in the 
Appendix. Loan controls include loan currency (EUR, GBP, USD), loan type (term, revolving), and loan 
purpose (acquisition, general corporate, LBO, project finance, debt refinancing). Standard errors (in 
brackets) are clustered by borrower. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Strong FTR -0.160** -0.159**   
 (0.063) (0.076)   
Very Strong FTR   -0.176*** -0.160** 
   (0.060) (0.064) 
Amount (log) -0.027 -0.027 -0.029 -0.027 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Maturity (log) 0.173*** 0.181*** 0.172*** 0.180*** 
 (0.048) (0.051) (0.048) (0.051) 
Secured 0.298*** 0.285*** 0.290*** 0.282*** 
 (0.059) (0.061) (0.059) (0.061) 
Covenants 0.171** 0.178** 0.160* 0.166** 
 (0.081) (0.079) (0.082) (0.080) 
Lenders (log) -0.083** -0.084** -0.084** -0.082** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
League 0.031 0.082 0.028 0.074 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.069) (0.070) 
Relationship -0.006 -0.006 0.005 0.002 
 (0.068) (0.069) (0.067) (0.069) 
Total assets (log) -0.119*** -0.120*** -0.115*** -0.118*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Debt / assets 0.362** 0.354** 0.364** 0.360** 
 (0.142) (0.153) (0.142) (0.154) 
ROA -2.053*** -2.050*** -2.083*** -2.063*** 
 (0.507) (0.531) (0.511) (0.529) 
Current ratio -1.401 -0.979 -1.209 -0.777 
 (3.167) (3.077) (3.154) (3.075) 
GDP per capita 
(log)  0.102  0.164 
  (0.135)  (0.132) 
Private credit  0.351***  0.339*** 
  (0.098)  (0.099) 
Stock market cap.  0.073  0.042 
  (0.120)  (0.119) 
Sovereign rating  0.021  0.019 
  (0.039)  (0.039) 
Intercept 5.943*** 4.227*** 5.862*** 3.508*** 
 (0.334) (1.358) (0.341) (1.306) 
Loan controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loans 966 926 966 926 
Adjusted R² 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.55 
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Table 4. 
Collateral 
 
This table presents the results of probit regressions examining the relation between the future tense 
reference and presence of collateral. The dependent variable is Secured. Definitions of variables are 
provided in the Appendix. Loan controls include loan currency (EUR, GBP, USD), loan type (term, 
revolving), and loan purpose (acquisition, general corporate, LBO, project finance, debt refinancing). 
Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered by borrower. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Strong FTR -0.307** -0.434**   
 (0.139) (0.183)   
Very Strong FTR   -0.416*** -0.406** 
   (0.138) (0.158) 
Amount (log) -0.131** -0.156*** -0.139** -0.157*** 
 (0.059) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
Covenants 1.195*** 1.208*** 1.176*** 1.179*** 
 (0.169) (0.168) (0.169) (0.168) 
Lenders (log) 0.044 0.057 0.040 0.058 
 (0.092) (0.094) (0.092) (0.095) 
League 0.369** 0.450*** 0.373** 0.432** 
 (0.169) (0.173) (0.164) (0.168) 
Relationship -0.239 -0.207 -0.214 -0.199 
 (0.167) (0.174) (0.166) (0.173) 
Total assets (log) -0.080* -0.075* -0.073* -0.070 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) 
Debt / assets 0.760** 0.873** 0.792** 0.873** 
 (0.361) (0.382) (0.368) (0.386) 
ROA -0.018 0.106 -0.001 0.124 
 (1.255) (1.335) (1.260) (1.339) 
Current ratio 6.348 7.081 7.118 7.839 
 (6.922) (7.028) (6.895) (7.043) 
GDP per cap. 
(log)  -0.397  -0.228 
  (0.346)  (0.321) 
Private credit  0.158  0.148 
  (0.247)  (0.247) 
Stock market cap.  0.178  0.107 
  (0.341)  (0.327) 
Sovereign rating  -0.065  -0.070 
  (0.100)  (0.099) 
Intercept 1.366* 1.498 1.203 -0.538 
 (0.797) (3.264) (0.799) (3.123) 
Loan controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year f.e.  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loans 934 894 934 894 
Pseudo-R² 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29 
Log.L -1184.40 -1111.53 -1176.00 -1109.66 
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Table 5. 
Maturity 
 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions examining the relation between the future tense reference 
and loan maturity. The dependent variable is the log of Maturity. Definitions of variables are provided in 
the Appendix. Loan controls include loan currency (EUR, GBP, USD), loan type (term, revolving), and 
loan purpose (acquisition, general corporate, LBO, project finance, debt refinancing).  Standard errors (in 
brackets) are clustered by borrower. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Strong FTR -0.010 -0.033   
 (0.038) (0.051)   
Very Strong FTR   -0.030 -0.036 
   (0.042) (0.047) 
Amount (log) -0.044** -0.052*** -0.044** -0.052*** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
Covenants 0.128*** 0.119** 0.127*** 0.116** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.048) 
Lenders (log) 0.030 0.043 0.030 0.043 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) 
League -0.065 -0.044 -0.064 -0.045 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) 
Relationship -0.030 -0.049 -0.028 -0.048 
 (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) 
Total assets (log) -0.032*** -0.027** -0.031*** -0.027** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Debt / assets 0.021 0.014 0.026 0.015 
 (0.114) (0.119) (0.115) (0.121) 
ROA 0.191 -0.017 0.189 -0.021 
 (0.375) (0.390) (0.374) (0.388) 
Current ratio -0.922 -1.478 -0.933 -1.437 
 (1.979) (2.006) (1.973) (2.001) 
GDP per cap. 
(log)  -0.104  -0.092 
  (0.083)  (0.074) 
Private credit  -0.003  -0.006 
  (0.074)  (0.073) 
Stock market cap.  0.058  0.053 
  (0.107)  (0.106) 
Sovereign rating  -0.016  -0.016 
  (0.026)  (0.027) 
Intercept 2.226*** 3.390*** 2.227*** 3.244*** 
 (0.551) (0.875) (0.549) (0.800) 
Loan controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year f.e.  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loans 966 926 966 926 
Adj.R² 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.22 
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Table 6. 
Robustness check: language of the lender 
 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions (for Spread and for Maturity) and probit regressions (for 
Secured) examining the relation between the future tense reference and loan characteristics. The dependent 
variable is mentioned at the top of each panel. Definitions of variables are provided in the Appendix. All 
regressions include loan variables ((1) and (3)) and country variables ((2) and (4)). Loan controls and year 
fixed effects are included in all estimations. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered by borrower. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable : Spread (log) 
Strong FTR Lender -0.153*** -0.150**   
 (0.057) (0.061)   
Very Strong FTR Lender   -0.229*** -0.215*** 
   (0.057) (0.058) 
Loans 966 926 966 926 
Adjusted R² 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.53 
     
Dependent variable : Secured 
Strong FTR Lender -0.210 -0.176   
 (0.131) (0.146)   
Very Strong FTR Lender   -0.243* -0.176 
   (0.141) (0.154) 
Loans 934 894 934 894 
Pseudo R² 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 
     
Dependent variable : Maturity (log) 
Strong FTR Lender -0.016 -0.026   
 (0.039) (0.041)   
Very Strong FTR Lender   -0.005 -0.014 
   (0.039) (0.041) 
Loans 966 926 966 926 
Adjusted R² 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.22 
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Table 7. 
Robustness check: domestic loans 
 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions (for Spread and for Maturity) and probit regressions (for 
Secured) examining the relation between the future tense reference and loan characteristics. The dependent 
variable is mentioned at the top of each panel. Definitions of variables are provided in the Appendix. All 
regressions include loan variables ((1) and (3)) and country variables ((2) and (4)). Loan controls and year 
fixed effects are included in all estimations. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered by borrower. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable : Spread (log) 
Strong FTR Lender -0.222*** -0.275**   
 (0.083) (0.114)   
Very Strong FTR Lender   -0.237*** -0.271*** 
   (0.079) (0.094) 
Loans 551 541 551 541 
Adjusted R² 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 
     
Dependent variable : Secured 
Strong FTR Lender -0.244 -0.004   
 (0.217) (0.322)   
Very Strong FTR Lender   -0.252 -0.086 
   (0.214) (0.306) 
Loans 519 509 519 509 
Pseudo R² 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32 
     
Dependent variable : Maturity (log) 
Strong FTR Lender 0.048 -0.021   
 (0.049) (0.065)   
Very Strong FTR Lender   0.021 -0.064 
   (0.049) (0.064) 
Loans 551 541 551 541 
Adjusted R² 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.22 
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Table 8. 
Robustness check: controlling for economic policy uncertainty 
 
This table presents the results of OLS regressions (for Spread and for Maturity) and probit regressions (for Secured) examining the relation between the future 
tense reference and loan characteristics. The dependent variable is mentioned at the top of each panel. Definitions of variables are provided in the Appendix. All 
regressions include loan variables and country variables. Loan controls and year fixed effects are included in all estimations. Standard errors (in brackets) are 
clustered by borrower. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 Spread (log) Secured Maturity (log) 
Strong FTR  -0.208**  -0.061  -0.030  
 (0.099)  (0.222)  (0.064)  
Very Strong FTR   -0.167*  0.142  -0.043 
  (0.093)  (0.251)  (0.055) 
Economic Policy 
Uncertainty 0.158 0.106 -0.301 -0.379 0.074 0.072 
 (0.100) (0.095) (0.277) (0.258) (0.073) (0.074) 
Loans 859 859 835 835 859 859 
Adjusted R² 0.54 0.54 0.30 0.30 0.21 0.21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
